UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN

JAMES A. LOVE,
Plaintiff,

v. **Case No. 19-C-1184**

G4S TRANSPORTATION SERVICES, *et al.*,
Defendants.

SCREENING ORDER

On December 11, 2019, I screened the complaint filed by pro se plaintiff James A. Love, dismissed it, and granted the plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint. ECF No. 12. The plaintiff has filed an amended complaint, which is now before me for screening. ECF No. 13. He also has filed several motions, which I will address in this order.

I. MOTION FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED WITHOUT PREPAYING THE FILING FEE

In the previous screening order, I granted the plaintiff's motion to proceed without prepaying the filing fee. ECF No. 12 at 1. The plaintiff has filed a second motion seeking the same. ECF No. 14. Because I granted his first such motion, the plaintiff's second motion to proceed without prepaying the filing fee is **DENIED** as moot.

II. SCREENING THE AMENDED COMPLAINT

A. Federal Screening Standard

As discussed in the previous order, under the PLRA I must screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). I must dismiss a complaint if the prisoner raises claims that are legally "frivolous or malicious," that fail to state a claim upon which

relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).

In determining whether the amended complaint states a claim, I apply the same standard that applies to dismissals under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). *See Cesal v. Moats*, 851 F.3d 714, 720 (7th Cir. 2017) (citing *Booker-El v. Superintendent, Ind. State Prison*, 668 F.3d 896, 899 (7th Cir. 2012)). To state a claim, the amended complaint must include "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The amended complaint must contain enough facts, accepted as true, to "state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face." *Ashcroft v. Iqbal*, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting *Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly*, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows a court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." *Id.* (citing *Twombly*, 550 U.S. at 556).

To state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that someone deprived him of a right secured by the Constitution or the laws of the United States, and that whoever deprived him of this right was acting under the color of state law. *D.S. v. E. Porter Cty. Sch. Corp.*, 799 F.3d 793, 798 (7th Cir. 2015) (citing *Buchanan–Moore v. Cty. of Milwaukee*, 570 F.3d 824, 827 (7th Cir. 2009)). I construe *pro se* complaints liberally and hold them to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by lawyers. *Cesal*, 851 F.3d at 720 (citing *Perez v. Fenoglio*, 792 F.3d 768, 776 (7th Cir. 2015)).

B. Plaintiff's Allegations

The plaintiff again lists as defendants Milwaukee County, Armor Healthcare Services, G4S Transportation Services, and the Mendota Mental Health Institute ("MMHI"). ECF No. 13 at 2.

The plaintiff's amended complaint is, in effect, two parts. The first part is on the standard complaint form for *pro se* prisoners. In this part, the plaintiff reiterates much of what he said in his initial complaint. He alleges that Milwaukee County failed to send him for medical treatment, forced him to attend a court hearing, and gave him his life savings in a sealed bag. ECF No. 13 at 2. He alleges that Armor Healthcare Services failed to provide him outside treatment but still took his money, prohibited him from using a phone to call for outside help or order food, and improperly overmedicated him and sent him for a court hearing in an overmedicated state. *Id.* at 2–3. He alleges that G4S Transportation Services did not follow proper protocol after he was injured while riding in a G4S vehicle. *Id.* at 3. Finally, he alleges that MMHI failed to provide medical treatment for a traumatic brain injury ("TBI") that he asserts he suffered. *Id.* The plaintiff does not allege that any individual (known or unknown) from these entities is responsible for the misconduct.

The second part of the amended complaint is several loose-leaf pages alleging numerous incidents against various defendants at the Milwaukee County Jail ("Jail"). The problems began on May 9 or 11, 2018, when a corrections officer screamed and frightened the plaintiff while he was asleep, causing him to jolt awake and hit his head. ECF No. 13 at 6. The officer told the plaintiff she screamed because she believed the plaintiff was dead. *Id.* The plaintiff reported feeling dizzy and nauseous, so the officer called for medical help. *Id.* Supervisor Jordan, a registered nurse, and "her team"

examined the plaintiff and told him they would take him to the hospital, but they never did. *Id.* at 6–7.

The plaintiff asked to see the incident report from his accident, but Lieutenant Fairacon and an unnamed corrections officer would not show him one and told him his signature was not needed. ECF No. 13 at 7. The plaintiff spoke with corrections officer Young, who helped the plaintiff read his mail and write a grievance and told him he needed to go to the hospital. *Id.* But the plaintiff still was not taken to the hospital. *Id.* Another unnamed corrections officer suggested the plaintiff see someone from the Psychiatric Services Unit ("PSU"). *Id.* at 8. The PSU examined the plaintiff, and Supervisor Jordan had him moved into a special-needs unit for all-day monitoring. *Id.* He alleges he was afraid to sleep and afraid for his life, was given only cold cuts to eat, and still was not taken to a hospital. *Id.* at 8–9.

The plaintiff continued to write medical service requests and grievances, and he wrote to Fox 6 News for help. ECF No. 13 at 9. He cried continuously until a member of the PSU told him he had to stop and that his condition would eventually improve. *Id.* at 10. She suggested the plaintiff take medication for his sadness and poor sleep. *Id.* The medication did not help much, which the plaintiff reported to PSU staff members Karan, John, and Jolha, a physical therapist named Chu, and doctor Debbie. *Id.* at 10–11.

The plaintiff further alleges that, while he was in the special-needs unit, an inmate hit him in the head with a basketball. ECF No. 13 at 11. The plaintiff reported this to corrections officer Condoff, who said he would look into it. *Id.* A nurse named Sam checked on the plaintiff and put him on new medication. *Id.* The plaintiff again never saw an incident report and filed a grievance about not receiving it. *Id.* He alleges that "they"

either hide or refuse to answer his grievances. *Id.* The plaintiff's symptoms worsened, but he was only given more medication and ice. *Id.* at 12. He alleges he was still forced to attend court hearings despite feeling dizzy and nauseous and suffering memory lapses. *Id.* He alleges a doctor named Stacker said she would attend court for the plaintiff, but the Jail "got rid of her." *Id.* at 13. Only Supervisor Jordan continues to help him. *Id.*

The plaintiff alleges that the Jail gave his property away without his consent and despite him asking the Jail not to give it away. ECF No. 13 at 13. He doesn't specify who at the Jail is responsible for his lost property.

The plaintiff's symptoms continued to worsen, and doctor Debbie increased his medication yet again. ECF No. 13 at 14. When he asked for the release of his medical records, unspecified jail staff told him his lawyer had to request it. *Id.* His lawyer requested the records, and the Jail released them, but the plaintiff alleges the Jail "made it look like I was not being up and up." *Id.*

The Jail eventually (the plaintiff does not allege how much time had passed since his injury) scheduled the plaintiff an appointment for a CT scan. *Id.* at 15. A driver from G4S Services arrived to take the plaintiff to his appointment at MMHI. *Id.* But he alleges that he was not given a CT scan and was only examined for the mental-health issues he had been experiencing. *Id.* The plaintiff spent two weeks at MMHI before G4S arrived to return him to the Jail. *Id.* On the way, the driver stopped suddenly, throwing everyone in the van to the front and worsening the plaintiff's condition. *Id.* The plaintiff alleges he was supposed to be wearing a helmet and seatbelt in the van but was not. *Id.* The plaintiff asked to be taken to a hospital, but the driver returned the plaintiff to the Jail. *Id.* at 16. Neither driver from G4S would tell the plaintiff their name. *Id.* Once back at the Jail, an

unnamed nurse from Armor Healthcare Services examined the plaintiff. *Id.* The plaintiff asked to be seen by PSU doctor John, who came and ordered the plaintiff returned to the special-needs unit. *Id.* The G4S drivers never reported the incident. *Id.* The plaintiff filed a grievance, which the Jail answered but G4S did not. *Id.* The plaintiff alleges that John from the PSU at the Jail told him that unspecified Armor Healthcare Services employees were fired, along with several staff members of the Jail. *Id.* at 20.

The plaintiff separately alleges that a nurse at Racine Correctional Institution, where he currently is incarcerated, is mistreating him. ECF No. 13 at 18. He alleges that a corrections officer would not allow him to eat in his cell, even though he previously had been allowed to. *Id.* Another staff member allegedly moved the plaintiff to a special-needs unit, but the plaintiff remains fearful for his life. *Id.* He alleges that unnamed nurses have placed him on fourteen different medications, and he is given only cold food to eat. *Id.* at 19.

The plaintiff also submitted a document that he titled "Motions to Address the Court with New Ev[idence]-(fact's)," in which he moves to add the names of numerous witnesses and other evidence. ECF No. 15. One page of this document is a list of names without any context or corresponding allegations. *Id.* at 2. Other pages list evidence and assertions that appear to challenge his state-court conviction. *Id.* at 4, 8. He also accuses PSU doctor John Sullivan of having him sign papers that the plaintiff could not read, which Sullivan said were for treatment of the plaintiff's TBI injury. *Id.* at 6. Sullivan then contacted a court and reported that the plaintiff was malingering. *Id.* Finally, the plaintiff seeks to sue his lawyer, John Miller, over papers he told the plaintiff he accidentally sent him. *Id.*

at 10–12. I will **GRANT** the motion to add new information, but whether the plaintiff states a proper claim with this new information will be analyzed below.

The plaintiff seeks $8 million in damages from each named defendant and asks the court for his freedom. ECF No. 13 at 4, 20.

C. Analysis

For the same reasons discussed in the previous screening order, the plaintiff fails to state a claim against Milwaukee County, Armor Healthcare Services, G4S Transportation Services, or the MMHI. *See* ECF No. 12 at 5–6.

The second part of the amended complaint alleges numerous facts and names several persons at the Jail. But the plaintiff never specifies who he wishes to sue. The plaintiff thanks PSU staff members Crues, Karan, Johow, John, Debbie, and Jordan for keeping him from taking his life, which suggests he does not wish to sue these individuals. ECF No. 13 at 17. At the end of his amended complaint, he states that he seeks $8 million from each of the four named defendants only. *Id.* at 20. He does not specify any other parties he wishes to hold liable.

From his allegations, the court can discern two possible claims for relief. First, he alleges that medical staff at the Jail failed properly to treat his head injury, which he believes was a TBI. And second, he alleges that the G4S drivers are responsible for their negligent driving and treatment of the plaintiff, which worsened his head injury.

The Court reviews the plaintiff's claim regarding his medical care under the Eighth Amendment, which prohibits cruel and unusual punishments. *See Estelle v. Gamble*, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). But not "every claim by a prisoner that he has not received adequate medical treatment states a violation of the Eighth Amendment." *Id.* at 105. To state a valid

Eighth Amendment claim, the inmate must allege both that he "suffered from an objectively serious medical condition" and that the defendants were "deliberately indifferent to that condition." *Petties v. Carter*, 836 F.3d 722, 728 (7th Cir. 2016) (citing *Farmer v. Brennan*, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994)). "[D]eliberate indifference describes a state of mind more blameworthy than negligence." *Farmer*, 511 U.S. at 835. A prison official cannot be found liable under the Eighth Amendment unless he subjectively knows of an excessive risk of harm to an inmate's health or safety and disregards that risk. *Id.* at 837; *Perez*, 792 F.3d at 776. "[A]n official's failure to alleviate a significant risk that he should have perceived but did not" does not amount to cruel and unusual punishment. *Farmer*, 511 U.S. at 838.

The plaintiff alleges that he hit his head, causing a TBI. A TBI unquestionably qualifies as a serious medical issue. The question is whether the plaintiff sufficiently alleges that any prison official knew about his injury and intentionally disregarded it. Although the plaintiff thanks Supervisor Jordan for treating him, he also alleges that Jordan told the plaintiff she would send him to a hospital but never followed through. Although she continued to monitor and treat the plaintiff, he alleges that his symptoms worsened in the Jail, and he was never taken to a hospital for proper treatment of his TBI. Persisting in an ineffective course of treatment violates the Eighth Amendment. *Greeno v. Daley*, 414 F.3d 645, 655 (7th Cir. 2005). I will therefore allow the plaintiff to proceed on an Eighth Amendment claim against Supervisor Jordan for failing to treat properly the plaintiff's TBI at the Jail.[1]

[1] The plaintiff also alleges that he received ineffective treatment at his current institution, the Racine Correctional Institution. Because those claims involve unrelated defendants

As noted in the previous screening order, G4S cannot be held liable for the negligence of its drivers. ECF No. 12 at 6 (citing *Farmer*, 511 U.S. at 835). The plaintiff alleges that he told the drivers he was supposed to be wearing a helmet and his seat belt during the ride, but the drivers did not listen, and the plaintiff was not wearing either during the ride. If the drivers were aware of the plaintiff's injury and his need for a helmet and a fastened seatbelt, and they failed to provide a helmet or assure the plaintiff had a helmet and a fastened seatbelt before driving him back to the Jail, they may have acted more than negligently and could be held liable under a theory of deliberate indifference. *Farmer*, 511 U.S. at 837; *Perez*, 792 F.3d at 776.

A suit under § 1983, however, may be brought only against government officials or employees or individuals who acted "under color of state law." *Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance Serv.*, 577 F.3d 816, 822 (7th Cir. 2009). A private party may act under color of state law only when the party "acted together with or . . . obtained significant aid from state officials" and did so to such a degree that its actions may properly be characterized as "state action." *Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co*., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982).

The plaintiff does not allege a basis for concluding that the G4S drivers acted under color of state law when they transported the plaintiff. It is possible, even likely, that G4S has contracted with the Jail to transport inmates to and from the Jail for appointments like the medical visit the plaintiff alleges. Although it is unclear from the amended complaint, the plaintiff "can[not] be charged fairly with knowing" whether G4S rendered its services

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for treatment not related to the treatment he received at the Jail, those claims must be filed in a separate lawsuit. *See George v. Smith*, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007); Fed. R. Civ. P. 18(a) and 20(a)(2).

pursuant to a contract between G4S and the Jail, which would make the drivers state actors in this lawsuit. *See Rodriguez*, 577 F.3d at 830. I will assume, only for the purposes of screening, that the drivers were acting under color of state law when they transported the plaintiff to and from the Jail and will allow the claim against them to proceed. The plaintiff will be required to use discovery to discern the names of the drivers and whether they were state actors at the time and are proper defendants in this suit.

To the extent the plaintiff seeks to state a claim against the inmate who hit him in the head with the basketball, he does not state a claim. A claim under § 1983 may be brought only against state actors. *See West v. Atkins*, 487 U.S. 42, 49 (1988). The inmate who hit him with the basketball is not a state actor and cannot be sued under § 1983.

Nor can the plaintiff sue his attorney under § 1983. Defense attorneys, whether state public defenders or privately retained counsel, also are not "state actors" and cannot be sued for damages under § 1983. *Polk County v. Dodson*, 454 U.S. 312, 318, 325 (1981); *see also Cornes v. Munoz*, 724 F.2d 61, 63 (7th Cir. 1983).

The plaintiff also has no claim regarding his unanswered grievances. There is no inherent constitutional right to a prison grievance system. *Antonelli v. Sheahan*, 81 F.3d 1422, 1430 (7th Cir. 1996). Therefore, any allegation that his grievances went unanswered does not state a claim. *George*, 507 F.3d at 609.

The plaintiff also may seek to bring a challenge to the taking of his property. But claims for deprivation of property are not actionable under § 1983 if adequate state remedies are available to redress the deprivation, even if the property is taken intentionally. *See Hudson v. Palmer*, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984); *Parratt v. Taylor*, 451 U.S. 527 (1981), *partially overruled on other grounds by Daniels v. Williams,* 474 U.S. 327,

330–31 (1986); *Mitchell v. Whiteleather*, 248 F.3d 1158, at *1 (7th Cir. 2000) (unpublished). The state of Wisconsin "provides several post-deprivation procedures for challenging the taking of property." *Cole v. Litscher*, 343 F. Supp. 2d 733, 742 (W.D. Wis. 2004) (citing Wis. Const. art. I, § 9; Wis. Stat. §§ 810 and 893). Therefore, the plaintiff's remedy for his taken property lies in state court.

To the extent the plaintiff seeks to challenge his conviction or sentence, he may not do so in this lawsuit. Those challenges must be brought in a petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. *See Heck v. Humphrey*, 512 U.S. 477, 481 (1994) (citing *Preiser v. Rodriguez*, 411 U.S. 475, 488–90 (1973)) ("[H]abeas corpus is the exclusive remedy for a state prisoner who challenges the fact or duration of his confinement . . . even though such a claim may come within the literal terms of § 1983.").

Finally, the plaintiff does not state a claim against any of the people he lists in his motion to address the court. ECF No. 15 at 2. Simply listing the names of putative defendants, without alleging what they did to violate his rights, is not enough to hold them liable under § 1983. *See Colbert v. City of Chicago*, 851 F.3d 649, 657 (7th Cir. 2017) (noting that to establish liability under § 1983, "[t]he plaintiff must demonstrate a causal connection between (1) the sued officials and (2) the alleged misconduct").

III. RECRUITMENT OF COUNSEL

The plaintiff also moves for recruitment of counsel because of his TBI and other medical issues. ECF No. 16. I have the discretion in civil cases to recruit counsel for individuals unable to afford counsel. *Navejar v. Iyola*, 718 F.3d 692, 696 (7th Cir. 2013); 28 U.S.C. §1915(e)(1); *Ray v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc.*, 706 F.3d 864, 866–67 (7th Cir. 2013). "[D]eciding whether to recruit counsel 'is a difficult decision: Almost everyone

would benefit from having a lawyer, but there are too many indigent litigants and too few lawyers willing and able to volunteer for these cases.'" *Henderson v. Ghosh*, 755 F.3d 559, 564 (7th Cir. 2014) (quoting *Olson v. Morgan*, 750 F.3d 708, 711 (7th Cir. 2014)).

In exercising this discretion, I must consider two things: "(1) 'has the indigent plaintiff made a reasonable attempt to obtain counsel or been effectively precluded from doing so,' and (2) 'given the difficulty of the case, does the plaintiff appear competent to litigate it himself?'" *Pennewell v. Parish et al.,* 923 F.3d 486, 490 (7th Cir. 2019), (quoting *Pruitt v. Mote*, 503 F.3d 647, 653 (7th Cir. 2007)). To satisfy the first element, I must determine that a plaintiff made a good faith effort to hire counsel. *Pickett v. Chicago Transit Authority,* 930 F.3d 869, 871 (7th Cir. 2019). To do so, the plaintiff must show he contacted at least three lawyers and provide the court with (1) the lawyers' names; (2) their addresses; (3) how and when the plaintiff attempted to contact them; and (4) the lawyers' responses.

When considering the second element, I "must examine the difficulty of litigating specific claims and the plaintiff's individual competence to litigate those claims without counsel." *Pennewell*, 923 F.3d at 490. I look at "whether the difficulty of the case, factually, legally, and practically, exceeds the litigant's capacity as a layperson to coherently litigate the case." *Id.* This includes "all tasks that normally attend litigation," such as "evidence gathering, preparing and responding to court filings and motions, navigating discovery, and putting on a trial." *Id.* at 490–491. I "must consider the plaintiff's literacy, communication skills, education level, litigation experience, intellectual capacity, psychological history, physical limitations and any other characteristics that may limit the plaintiff's ability to litigate the case." *Id.* at 491. In situations where the plaintiff files his

motion in the early stages of the case, I may determine that it is "impossible to tell whether [the plaintiff] could represent himself adequately." *Pickett* 930 F.3d at 871.

The plaintiff does not allege that he has contacted any attorneys to request their assistance. He therefore has not satisfied the first element. Although the plaintiff's filings to date suggest he may need assistance litigating this case, I will decline to recruit counsel at this early stage of the proceedings. As the case progresses, the legal and factual issues may become too complex for the plaintiff, his circumstances may change, or he may find himself unable to obtain the information he believes he needs to prove his claims. Should that occur, it may be appropriate to recruit counsel to represent the plaintiff. I will therefore **DENY** the motion without prejudice to him refiling it, if necessary, at a later time.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated, **IT IS ORDERED** that the plaintiff's second motion for leave to proceed without prepaying the filing fee (ECF No. 14) is **DENIED** as moot.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the plaintiff's motion to address the court with new evidence and information (ECF No. 15) is **GRANTED**.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the plaintiff's motion to recruit counsel (ECF No. 16) is **DENIED** without prejudice.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendants Milwaukee County, Armor Healthcare Services, and Mendota Mental Health Institute are **DISMISSED**. The court **ADDS** defendant Supervisor Jordan and John Doe G4S drivers.

Under an informal service agreement between Milwaukee County and this court, a copy of the amended complaint and this order have been electronically transmitted to Milwaukee County for service on defendant Supervisor Jordan. It is **ORDERED** that,

under the informal service agreement, defendant Supervisor Jordan shall file a responsive pleading to the amended complaint within 60 days.

Because the plaintiff does not know the names of the G4S drivers, the court will keep G4S Transportation Services as a defendant for the limited purpose of helping the plaintiff identify the names of the defendants. *See Donald v. Cook County Sheriff's Dept.*, 95 F.3d 548, 556 (7th Cir. 1996). The court will order the Marshals to serve G4S with the plaintiff's amended complaint and a copy of this order. G4S does not have to respond to the amended complaint. After the lawyer for G4S files an appearance in this case, the plaintiff may serve discovery upon G4S (by mailing it to his attorney at the address in his notice of appearance) to get information that will help him identify the names of the defendants.

For example, the plaintiff may serve interrogatories (written questions) under Fed. R. Civ. P. 33 or document requests under Fed. R. Civ. P. 34. Because the plaintiff does not state a claim against G4S, the plaintiff's discovery requests must be limited to information or documents that will help him learn the real names of the defendants he is suing. The plaintiff may not ask G4S about any other topic, and G4S is under no obligation to respond to requests about any other topic.

After the plaintiff learns the names of the people he alleges violated his constitutional rights, he must file a motion to substitute their names for the John Doe placeholders. The court will dismiss G4S as a defendant once the plaintiff identifies the defendants' names. After the defendants have an opportunity to respond to the plaintiff's amended complaint, the court will set a deadline for discovery. At that point, the plaintiff may use discovery to get the information he believes he needs to prove his claims.

The plaintiff must identify the names of the John Doe defendants within sixty days of G4S's attorney appearing. If he does not or does not explain to the court why he is unable to do so, I may dismiss the G4S drivers from this case based on his failure to diligently prosecute his case. Civil L. R. 41(c).

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the United States Marshal serve a copy of the amended complaint and this order on G4S Transportation Services under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4. Congress requires the U.S. Marshals Service to charge for making or attempting such service. 28 U.S.C. § 1921(a). Although Congress requires the court to order service by the U.S. Marshals Service, it has not made any provision for either the court or the U.S. Marshals Service to waive these fees. The current fee for waiver-of-service packages is $8.00 per item mailed. The full fee schedule is provided at 28 C.F.R. §§ 0.114(a)(2), (a)(3). The U.S. Marshals will give the plaintiff information on how to remit payment. The court is not involved in collection of the fee.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that G4S Transportation Services does not have to respond to the plaintiff's amended complaint; however, it must respond to the plaintiff's discovery requests as described in this order.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the plaintiff identify the real names of the Doe defendants within sixty days of G4S Transportation Services appearing in the case. If he does not, or does not explain to the court why he is unable to identify their real names, the court may dismiss the G4S drivers from this case based on his failure to diligently prosecute his case. Civil L.R. 41(c).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that a copy of this order be sent to the officer in charge of the agency where plaintiff is confined.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the parties may not begin discovery until after the court enters a scheduling order setting deadlines for discovery and dispositive motions.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiffs who are inmates at Prisoner E-Filing Program institutions[2] must submit all correspondence and case filings to institution staff, who will scan and e-mail documents to the court. Plaintiffs who are inmates at all other prison facilities must submit the original document for each filing to the court to the following address:

Office of the Clerk
United States District Court
Eastern District of Wisconsin
362 United States Courthouse
517 E. Wisconsin Avenue
Milwaukee, Wisconsin 53202

PLEASE DO NOT MAIL ANYTHING DIRECTLY TO THE JUDGE'S CHAMBERS. It will only delay the processing of the matter.

The plaintiff is further advised that failure to make a timely submission may result in the dismissal of this case for failure to diligently pursue it. In addition, the parties must notify the Clerk of Court of any change of address. Failure to do so could result in orders or other information not being timely delivered, thus affecting the legal rights of the parties.

Dated at Milwaukee, Wisconsin, this 5th day of March, 2020.

s/Lynn Adelman_____
LYNN ADELMAN
United States District Judge

[2] The Prisoner E-Filing Program is mandatory for all inmates of Green Bay Correctional Institution, Waupun Correctional Institution, Dodge Correctional Institution, Wisconsin Secure Program Facility, Columbia Correctional Institution, and Oshkosh Correctional Institution.